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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper presents a survey of recent research on the 
economics of infrastructure in developing countries. 
Energy, transport, telecommunications, water and 
sanitation are considered. The survey covers two main 
set of issues: the linkages between infrastructure and 
economic growth (at the economy-wide, regional and 
sectoral level) and the composition, sequencing and 
efficiency of alternative infrastructure investments, 
including the arbitrage between new investments 
and maintenance expenditures; OPEX and CAPEX, 
and public versus private investment. Following 
This paper—a product of the Development Research Department, Research Support Unit (DECRS)—is part of a larger 
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recent policy research and diagnostic analyses of the current state-of-the-art in priority areas for developing countries.. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. For information, contact 
jdethier@worldbank.org.
the introduction, section 2 discusses the theoretical 
foundations (growth theory and new economic 
geography). Section 3 assesses the analysis of 140 
specifications from 64 recent empirical papers—
examining type of data used, level of aggregation, 
econometric techniques and nature of the sample—and 
discusses both the macro-econometric and micro-
econometric contributions of these papers. Finally section 
4 discusses directions for future research and suggests 
priorities in data development.
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 I. Introduction 
 
Writing the introduction to a survey on infrastructure and development sometimes 
feels like an impressionistic exercise, especially if it is mostly policy oriented. Indeed, 
one feels compelled to start by painting an overview of the state of infrastructure 
sectors in developing countries, in particular with respect to existing stocks, 
households and firms access to services, and past and present investment figures. 
However, one quickly realizes that on all these issues, at best only patchy information 
is available, ending up with a number of stylized facts that do not completely fit 
together, information holes that can’t be filed, time series that stop ten years ago, etc. 
So while most practitioners and people living in developing countries know about 
chronic infrastructure deficiencies, and it is possible to appeal to statistics showing 
cruel deficiencies in sectors such as sanitation, water or electricity, there is no 
completely satisfying way to systematically document the state of infrastructure in 
and across many poor countries. 
 
The world’s number one provider of statistics on developing countries, the World 
Bank, has in its more than 60 years of functioning considered infrastructure as one of 
its top priorities. Indeed, between 1970 and 2005, infrastructure-related lending has 
oscillated between 1/3 and 2/3 of the Bank’s total lending.2 However, researchers of 
the subject acknowledge that the current state of statistical knowledge is less than 
satisfying.3 Of course, this also implies strong limitations in the quality and relevance 
of empirical research that can be performed. 
 
Based on this assessment, the objective of this paper is not to be an additional survey 
of the theoretical or empirical literature on the subject.4 Instead, it starts from a 
literature review of recent contributions to highlight what works and what doesn’t 
work when trying to understand the causal pathways between infrastructure 
investment and development outcomes, in order to draw conclusions along two 
dimensions: First, which type of research is more likely to be useful in the search for 
implementable policy recommendations and second, which type of data are needed to 
carry out such research.  
 
More precisely, the discussion is organized around two main set of issues. First of all, 
it focuses on the linkages between infrastructure and economic growth on an economy 
wide, regional and sectoral basis. This is clearly where the bulk of contributions are 
found, with studies looking at the impact of infrastructure on a variety of indicators 
such as output level or output growth, productivity, etc., and also where a wide array 
of sometimes contradictory results is found. Some of the relevant questions are the 
relevance of infrastructure spending at different stages of development (e.g. for low 
and middle income developing countries, possibly taking into account other specific 
                                                 
2 Figures for 2005 indicate a total of IBRD/IDA lending of close to $8 billion. See World Bank (2006). 
3 See for example Estache and Fay (2007), Briceño-Garmendia and Klytchnikova (2006) and Briceño-
Garmendia, Estache and Shafik (2004) for a more detailed discussion on the main holes in the 
infrastructure picture. 
4 Previous surveys include Munnel (1992), Gramlich (1994), Sturm et al. (1998), Romp and de Haan 
(2005) and Prud’homme (2005) among others. 
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initial conditions); the role of infrastructure in creating or closing the gap between 
poor and rich regions within and across countries, as well among urban and rural 
areas, etc. 
 
Second, it addresses the issue of composition, sequencing and efficiency of alternative 
infrastructure investments. This includes aspects such as the arbitrage between new 
investments and maintenance expenditures, operational expenditure (OPEX) and 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), public versus private investment, as well as different 
infrastructure sub-sectors. The objective is to inform the discussion on aspects such as 
the contribution of different composition of infrastructure investment in terms of 
growth, the difference in performance of infrastructure industries where a specific 
sequencing of market based reforms (including privatization regulatory reforms and 
introduction of competition) has been implemented or, in those infrastructure 
industries that have remained regulated, what forms of regulation have been most 
successful, what regulatory mechanisms have yielded superior economic 
performance, whether those countries and infrastructure sectors that have unbundled 
and attempted to introduce competition produced greater benefits for these sectors and 
other sectors of the economy, etc. Note, however, that results on these topics have 
often not been explicitly integrated in the broader picture of infrastructure 
development in developing countries, so this paper will mostly highlight gaps and 
avenues for future research. 
 
Regarding data and empirical work, a few main conclusions emerge. First, the macro-
econometric approach, although it has been useful to strengthen the conviction that 
many aspects of infrastructure do indeed matter for development, has probably 
reached a limit and the type of policy lessons that practitioners are looking for are 
unlikely to be provided by such an approach. One area, though, where this type of 
data can provide additional knowledge is the analysis of how institutional, regulatory 
and political economy aspects affect the amount and quality of infrastructure services 
provided. Important efforts both to model the theoretical channels involved and to 
systematize the corresponding institutional and political data appear necessary. 
 
Following recent development in theory, the area that seems more promising is the 
economic geography one. Its main strength is the ability to insert micro-level data in a 
global framework that accounts for the spatial, sectoral and macroeconomic linkages 
of investments in infrastructure. This literature, however, is still very new in terms of 
both its theoretical extensions to policy issues, the integration in the models of more 
realistic infrastructure proxies, and its empirical validation. The main challenges 
identified in the paper have to do with additional theoretical advances and with the 
development of the right econometric framework to test dynamic models 
characterized by threshold effects and multiple equilibria.  
 
At the data level, the systematic development of infrastructure-related micro-level 
firm and household data is advocated. The objectives are differentiated according to 
the nature of sectors. For transport data, in particular road and railroad statistics, the 
paper argues that the aim should be regional (within country) data disaggregated at 
several levels of road quality / class, of the type already available for some countries 
such as China. For energy, telecommunications, water and sanitation on the other 
hand, it argues for the systematic collection of data in household- and firm-level 
surveys, with a view on upward aggregation to generate village- or district-level 
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average access statistics. Additional data on quality, costs and institutional aspects 
should also be collected in this way. Finally, econometric issues linked to the use of 
this type of data are also discussed, one key aspect being the endogeneity of firms’ 
technological choices.  
 
In summary, this paper’s recommendations converge to the combination of three main 
components at the macro-, micro- and economic geography level. A drive to 
strengthen collection of microeconomic data through both household and firm-level 
surveys, considering the need to take into account institutional constraints (ownership 
of surveys) and limitation in their current design, should support major theoretical and 
empirical efforts at the macro-level (especially with regards to the assessment of the 
impact of political, institutional and regulatory aspects on the delivery and efficiency 
of infrastructure services), and at the economic geography level. 
 
Infrastructure is understood in this paper to include the following sectors: Energy, 
transport, telecommunications, water and sanitation. Although some of the material 
discussed bears on developed countries, the focus of the conclusion is on low and 
middle income transition and developing countries. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical foundations of the effect of infrastructure 
on growth and other development outcomes in the context of growth theory and of the 
new economic geography literature. It then discusses to what extent the literature 
reviewed provides answers to the two broad set of issues mentioned above. Section 3 
reviews how these insights have been taken to the data. It starts with an overall 
assessment of the empirical literature based on the analysis of 140 specifications from 
64 papers between 1989 and 2007, looking in details at the type of data used, the level 
of aggregation, the technique, the nature of the sample, etc. It then discusses 
macroeconometric contributions, looking at the questions addressed, the main 
methodological issues and the limitations of this approach. Next, it reviews studies 
including geographical insights. Microeconometric contributions are mentioned, and 
finally a review of lessons according to the two set of issues above is performed. 
Based on this, Section 4 spells out what appear to be the most promising directions for 
future research, highlighting key short to medium term working objectives. 
Suggestions of priorities in data development are presented. 
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II. Theory 
 
The theoretical foundations of the effect of infrastructure on growth and more 
generally on development outcomes are mostly to be found in growth theory5 and the 
new economic geography literature. 
1. Growth Theory 
A number of theoretical justifications for advocating policies fostering investment in 
infrastructure are found in the growth literature. Most of the channels discussed in this 
context can be represented in the following generic framework based on an aggregate 
production function:6 
 
Q = A(θ, KI).F(K, L, G(KI)),   (1) 
 
where Q is real aggregate output, K is the (non-infrastructure) aggregate capital stock, 
KI the infrastructure capital stock, L aggregate hours worked by the labor force, and 
A(.) is a standard productivity term, which we discuss below. Note that KI enters the 
production function F(.) through a function G(KI). As it stands, this formulation can 
accommodate infrastructure considered simply as an additional factor of production 
(G(KI)=KI), as is often done in the macro literature (Romp and de Haan, 2005). This 
assumes that the stock of infrastructure has pure public good attributes and produces 
services in a non-rival and non-excludable way.  
 
However, there are reasons to allow for a different way to incorporate infrastructure in 
the production function. First, it is not always the case that infrastructure has pure 
public good attributes and in the last decades a growing part of infrastructure 
investment has been mediated through the market and has taken characteristics of 
standard private goods. Second, even when private operators are involved, the level of 
unit costs and prices of infrastructure services are often not strictly market 
determined7, so including KI as a factor in the production function would rely on the 
unrealistic assumption that firms are able to make informed decisions on the cost of 
the amount of infrastructure capital they use (Duggal, Saltzman and Klein, 1999). 
 
Under this interpretation, infrastructure KI enter the production function through the 
services provided by this type of capital (G(KI)=I(KI)), rather than simply as an 
additional factor of production as is often assumed in the literature. I(KI) is an 
intermediate inputs variable, and an increase in KI lowers the cost of related 
intermediate inputs like transport, communications, etc., that enter firms’ production 
                                                 
5 Standard general growth theory references are Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004). Agénor (2004) and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) discuss and model several channels 
through which infrastructure may affect growth. 
6 Arguably, this is a very simple framework that obviates numerous relevant issues, such as problems 
of aggregation. See a more detailed discussion in Straub (2007) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005). 
7 The reasons include regulatory oversight of prices in certain sectors and more generally problems to 
determine the real costs and prices (Pritchett, 1996). 
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functions.8 Hulten, Bennathan and Srinavasan (2003) call this a market-mediated 
effect of infrastructure. Whether introduced directly or as a source of specific services, 
G(KI) captures what I will call the “direct” effects of infrastructure. 
 
Moreover, note that the formulation in (1) distinguishes between two sources of 
increases in the productivity parameter A: generic efficiency-enhancing externalities, 
represented by θ, and efficiency-enhancing externalities specifically linked to the 
accumulation of infrastructure capital. I refer to this effect as an “indirect” effect of 
infrastructure. 
 
Note furthermore that this formulation does not make specific assumptions on the 
nature of returns to scale. Depending on the elasticity of infrastructure introduced as 
part of the F(.) function and on the strength of potential externalities, it may 
accommodate diminishing, constant or increasing returns. Whether the effects of 
infrastructure are strong enough to generate an endogenous growth process will be of 
considerable theoretical and empirical importance in terms of the potential impact of 
infrastructure, in particular when considering whether it acts simply as an additional 
capital accumulation device or has the potential to generate long term permanent 
growth effects.  
Direct Channels 
 
The direct channels from infrastructure capital, whether in its pure public good or 
intermediate inputs form, to growth first involve a simple productivity effect.  Indeed, 
in a standard production function with factors being gross complements, an increase 
in the stock of infrastructure would raise the productivity of the other factors. As 
signaled above, whether the productivity-enhancing effects will result in a higher 
steady-state growth rate or not will depend on the assumptions made on aggregate 
returns to scale.9 An extreme version of the direct effect of infrastructure corresponds 
to the case of strong complementarities. For example, by providing access to certain 
remote or uncommunicated areas, roads or bridges make private investment possible. 
Similarly, by giving entrepreneurs access to certain services such as electricity or 
telecommunications, investments in critical parts of infrastructure networks enable 
corresponding private investment. Note, however, that the way infrastructure 
investments are financed is obviously not neutral and that the risk of a crowding-out 
effect on private investment exists, especially if these investments are financed 
through taxation or borrowing on domestic financial markets. 
Indirect Channels 
 
More interesting, however, are potential indirect channels that reveal the possibility of 
growth effect of infrastructure investments above and beyond the simple factor 
accumulation effect. A (possibly non-exhaustive) list includes: 
  
• Maintenance and private capital durability. A crucial aspect that has received 
relatively little attention in the literature although practitioners are well aware of 
                                                 
8 See Fernald (1999) for an application to the impact of the road infrastructure in the US on specific 
industrial sectors. 
9 See Barro (1990) for a model displaying this channel in the context of an AK-type of dynamics. 
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its importance is maintenance of the existing infrastructure stock. Indeed, it is 
often argued that infrastructure policy is biased toward the realization of new 
investments at the detriment of the maintenance of the existing stock. Two main 
reasons for politicians having such a bias have been mentioned.  Rioja (2003) 
posits that maintenance is tax-financed, while new investments rely on soft 
international loans, which are more palatable to politicians as long as they do not 
have too many strings attached. Alternatively, new investments may have higher 
“political visibility” and shorter “horizon” than maintenance, which only has 
gradual effects on the quality of the infrastructure stock (see for example Maskin 
and Tirole, 2007, and Dewatripont and Seabright, 2006). This lower-than-optimal 
level of maintenance has two consequences. First, it reduces the life-span of the 
existing stock of infrastructure itself. Rioja (1999) and Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis 
(2004) have modeled this phenomenon in the context of exogenous growth 
models. Second, it is well documented that it also implies higher operative costs 
and reduced duration of private capital, such as trucks operating on low-quality 
roads or machines connected to unstable voltage lines. 
 
• Adjustment costs. A closely related aspect is signaled by Agénor and Moreno-
Dodson (2006). Improvements in the stock of infrastructure capital are likely to 
reduce private capital adjustment costs, through at least two related channels. 
First, by lowering the logistic cost of such investments and second by allowing for 
the substitution of palliative private investments in devices such as electricity 
generators for more productive investments in machinery for example. Ample 
evidence from firm-level surveys such as investment climate assessments (ICAs) 
backs up this assumption (see evidence of this in Lee, Anas and Oh (1996) for 
Indonesia and Nigeria, Alby and Straub (2007) for Latin America, Reinikka and 
Svensson (2002) for Uganda among others). Improvements in the stocks of 
infrastructure, as they make the services more reliable, reduce firms’ necessity to 
invest in substitutes in order to hedge against potential service interruptions, 
thereby freeing up resources for private productive investment. Reinikka and 
Svensson (2002) show that this may be aggravated by a selection effect, as the 
firms that actually invest in substituting devices are the bigger or more profitable 
ones, resulting in even larger investment shortfalls. 
 
• Labor productivity. Another posited channel is the potential effect on labor 
productivity due to reductions in time wasted commuting to work and stress, as 
well as to the more efficient ways of organizing work time as a result of improved 
information and communication technology, learning by doing, etc… 
 
• Impact on human development. Numerous microeconometric studies have 
documented that better infrastructure induces improvement in both health and 
education10, which increase labor productivity both in the short term by making 
the existing stock of human capital more effective, and in the medium and long 
term by inducing additional investment in education. 
 
• Economies of scale and scope. A few examples include better transport 
infrastructure that, by lowering transport costs, leads to economies of scale, better 
                                                 
10 See for example Galiani et al. (2005) and Thomas and Strauss (1992). 
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inventory management and a different pattern of agglomeration (Hulten et al., 
2003; Baldwin et al., 2004); changes in the pattern of specialization of agents and 
incentives to invest in innovation as the transport and communication 
infrastructure, and therefore access to market, change;  network externalities; 
more efficient market clearing and enhanced competition as a result of improved 
information flows (see Jensen, 2007). 
 
Most of the effects alluded to in the last bullet point, however, open to mechanisms 
best modeled within a spatial framework such as the new economic geography one. 
There are treated in detail in the following section. 
2.   Economic Geography 
One striking feature of the literature reviewed so far is the fact that it completely 
overlooks one of infrastructure’s main characteristics, namely its geographical 
dimension. Indeed, it is fairly obvious that infrastructure investment is by nature 
spatial, since it involves rival choices on the location of equipments that will serve 
limited geographical areas. This is true for example of roads, bridges, canals, airports 
and railroads for transport, pipes and sewerage networks for water and waste water 
treatment, base towers for telecommunication services, electricity or gas networks and 
connections for energy. 
 
Second, infrastructure services are an input in both households’ and firms’ 
consumption and investment decisions. Variations in the availability and quality of 
infrastructure across space will therefore result in different economic agents’ behavior 
depending on their location. Moreover, they will also crucially influence agents’ 
location decisions, such as migration, establishment of new firms, investment of 
capital at different locations, etc. 
 
This section summarizes the available body of knowledge on these issues. It first 
reviews what economic theory has to say on spatial dimensions of economic activity. 
Specifically, it starts by looking at the so-called “new economic geography”, which 
started with the work of Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, Anthony Venables and co-
authors in the early 1990s and for which an early synthesis is Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables (1999) (hereinafter referred to as FKV). A following generation of models, 
for which an excellent synthesis is found in Baldwin et al (2003), blended the new 
economic geography framework with endogenous growth to analyze more 
specifically policy issues, including infrastructure. After briefly summarizing the 
main building blocks of these frameworks, I reflect on how they allow us to think 
about infrastructure issues and on their main shortcomings in that perspective.11 
 
Finally, I mention another related literature, namely that on urban and regional 
economics, and in particular on the modeling of cities. Because along the process of 
development the nature of infrastructure needs is strongly shaped by issues such as 
rural-urban migration, the size of cities and the spatial distribution of economic 
activity, both between but also within cities that sometimes span large geographical 
areas, these contributions allow to a certain extent to open what has previously mostly 
                                                 
11 Note that the variety and complexity of models reviewed makes it intractable to develop a common 
framework, such as the one in the previous section, in the context of this paper. 
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been modeled as a black box. Of course, there are many overlaps in recent research 
inspired by standard location theory and new economic geography, as can be seen for 
example in the Fujita and Thisse (2002) synthesis of these issues. The way I organize 
the present discussion is for analytical convenience only. 
New Economic Geography and Public Policy 
 
There are many excellent textbooks and surveys covering the main results of the “new 
economic geography” and the purpose of this survey is by no mean to replicate these, 
but instead to highlight the main features of these models that are relevant to 
meaningfully discuss infrastructure issues.12 
 
The canonical new economic geography model has two regions, which may initially 
be symmetric in their endowments of the two factors of production (capital and labor), 
ruling out standard comparative advantages. There are two sectors of production, a 
traditional one (often alluded to as agriculture) producing a freely tradable good under 
constant returns to scale, and a modern (say, industrial) one characterized by 
imperfect competition and differentiated products. Finally, workers and capital may 
be characterized by different degrees of mobility between regions.13 This literature 
further distinguish geographical aspects termed “first nature”, such as natural 
conditions of the soil, proximity to coasts or rivers, weather conditions, from “second 
nature” attributes resulting from the non random location of firms and workers across 
space. Its objective is therefore to explain how such patterns of agglomeration may 
arise, above and beyond first nature attributes of different locations, and how they 
may be affected by policy interventions such as subsidies to firms or human capital 
accumulation, and the accumulation of infrastructure capital among others. 
 
The main feature of economic geography models is that they consider this second 
nature dimension of economic activity to be the result of the interplay between 
agglomeration and dispersion forces.14 Technically, agglomeration forces arise as the 
result of increasing returns that may be either internal or external to the firms in the 
industrial sector.15 Internal increasing returns may be due to backward, demand 
linkages, often called the “market access effect” or “home market effect”, that push 
firms to locate their activities in regions with bigger markets to be able to serve more 
consumers avoiding trade costs, or to forward, cost linkages that bid input prices 
down and again tend to attract firms to already crowded locations. 
 
Agglomeration may also arise for reasons external to the firms, such as knowledge 
spillovers or labor market externalities linked to the greater availability and better 
training of workers, as already mentioned by Marshall in the 19th century.  
 
                                                 
12 See for example FKV (1999), Neary (2001), Baldwin et al. (2003), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004). 
Henderson, Shalizi and Venables (2001) discuss some of these issues specifically in a development 
perspective. 
13 See Puga (2001) for a discussion of the differences between models with and without migration. 
Empirically, migration is lower in the EU that in the US, which justifies alternative assumptions. 
14 Of course, different models display different combinations of (a subset of) these forces. 
15 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a recent survey on the empirical evidence on these 
agglomeration forces. Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2007) find evidence for all the mechanisms discussed 
here. 
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These centripetal forces are potentially balanced by a number of dispersion forces 
again affecting both the supply and the demand side of relevant markets. These 
include first the fact that some factors, such as land and labor, are at least partially 
immobile so their prices might be bidden up as agglomeration goes on, an outcome 
that will generate an increasing tension for firms having to face fiercer competition in 
bigger agglomerations. Second, dispersed immobile labor implies that firms 
agglomerating at a given location neglect distant markets. Finally congestion also bids 
up the cost of living in large cities.16 
 
The key point is that when agglomeration forces dominate dispersion forces, a shock 
to the initial distribution of workers and firms (for example migration by a worker or 
investment of some capital in a different location) will trigger a cumulative process of 
agglomeration and all industry and workers will move to one region. Conversely, if 
dispersion forces dominate, an initial symmetric distribution between two regions will 
be stable as any shock would be immediately reversed.  
 
Transport costs are what determine the balance between agglomeration and 
dispersion. In most economic geography models, these are modeled simply as 
“iceberg” transport costs, i.e. by assuming that a fraction of the goods shipped melts 
down during transportation. Looking at the effects spelled out above, it appears that 
both agglomeration and dispersion forces diminish as trade costs decline. For 
example, the market access effect loses relevance as the differential cost of serving 
consumers at home or at the other location shrinks, but the wage effect linked to 
greater competition is also less relevant for firms, and so is the issue of forgoing 
distant markets. In most models, such as the core-periphery (CP) model of FKV, 
dispersion forces tend to dominate when transport costs are high, but they decline 
more rapidly than agglomeration forces when these costs are reduced (see Baldwin et 
al., 2003, for a more formal discussion). This gives rise to the well-know “tomahawk 
bifurcation” diagram of FKV, which shows that symmetric dispersed outcomes are 
stable at high transport costs, while a process of catastrophic agglomeration (in the 
sense that all firms and workers move to one region) happens below a certain level. 
Moreover, there is usually a middle range of values for which both dispersion and 
agglomeration are stable equilibria.17 Which equilibrium prevails then comes down to 
historical initial conditions, specific exogenous shocks or policy interventions. 
 
In the range of models discussed so far, the main outcome is the long-run 
geographical pattern of economic activity.18 There are at least two reasons why such 
models are ill-equipped for regional policy analysis. First, shift in the spatial 
distribution of firms can at best be an intermediate objective for policy makers and the 
final objective is more likely to combine concerns for output growth and its 
distribution among the population. Moreover, in these frameworks, industry 
                                                 
16 Empirical evidence shows that the cost of living roughly doubles between a city of 100,000 and one 
of 5 million inhabitants, with wages following. Moreover, higher urban concentration appears to 
correspond to increased child mortality, higher pupil-teacher ratio and increased use of non-potable 
water among others (Henderson et al., 2001). 
17 Note that not all economic geography models display such catastrophic agglomeration process. For 
example, models with no or limited worker migration are more likely to give rise to intermediate 
outcomes (Puga, 2001). 
18 See Baldwin et al. (2003), chapters 2 to 6, for a number of models that display properties close to 
that of the canonical CP model. 
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agglomeration is always a win-lose situation. It is therefore clear that policy lessons 
on infrastructure require the growth dimension. 
 
Starting with Martin and Ottaviano (1999), models blending economic geography 
with endogenous growth have been developed to address a number of policy issues.19 
These models rely generally on the existence of technological externalities between 
firms to overcome the tendency to diminishing returns. Furthermore, for geography to 
have a distinct impact on the long-term growth rate, these spillovers have to be of 
local nature20, an assumption that is warranted by empirical evidence (e.g. Jaffe et al. 
1993; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Note also that endogenous growth represents an 
additional agglomeration force, while knowledge spillovers are an additional 
dispersion force.  
  
In the context of these models, Baldwin et al. (2003) put forward a number of 
conclusions on infrastructure policy. The main policy trade-off arising from a 
geography and growth model is a spatial equity-efficiency trade-off. Indeed, the static 
loss in the periphery resulting from industrial agglomeration may be compounded by 
faster growth overall, so there might be a global dynamic gain, and the overall effect 
on the periphery is no longer unambiguously bad. Obviously, this conclusion and the 
strength of the trade-offs discussed below will be affected by whether the degree of 
agglomeration in equilibrium is above or below the optimal level.21 
 
The basic lessons are based on different consequences of this trade-off. First, 
infrastructure policies that facilitate transport between regions, for example the 
building or improvement of major road corridors, will increase both regional 
inequality and national growth. On the other hand, infrastructure policies that 
facilitate transport within poor regions will have the opposite effects of decreasing 
regional inequality but also slowing down national growth. These trade-offs will be 
even stronger if richer regions are characterized by a mix of (first) nature endowment 
and technological conditions that positively affect both the return from private and 
public capital (Puga, 2001). 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the normative take on these issues depends strongly 
on the mix and the nature of objectives, growth and redistribution, sectoral and social 
groups targeting, that policy makers pursue. It also depends on the strength of 
redistribution instruments that they have at their disposal. In particular, in countries 
where taxation and redistribution faces greater institutional constraints, i.e. the 
shadow cost of public fund is higher, these trade-offs will be more acute. 
 
Contrary to the case of transport costs, a win-win situation arises when considering 
public policies that facilitate the inter-regional diffusion of technology spillovers, as 
these decrease regional inequality while increasing national growth. This is not 
surprising since the local nature of these inter-firms externalities is precisely the 
ingredient that generates the spatial equity-efficiency trade-off in the models. Baldwin 
et al. (2003) consider policies aimed at facilitating all forms of telecommunications, 
                                                 
19 See Baldwin et al. (2003), chapter 7. 
20 Intuitively, if spillovers are global, any technological improvement benefits to all firms regardless of 
their location, so the spatial distribution of firms does not affect growth. 
21 Henderson (2003) shows that both cases are likely to prevail in a cross-section of cities. 
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increasing competition or fostering investment in human capital as potentially 
facilitating the trade in ideas and knowledge. However, as they acknowledge, it is not 
clear in practice whether we can disentangle the effects of transport or 
telecommunication policies on goods versus knowledge trade. In other words, policies 
aimed at a specific type of infrastructure may well facilitate both the transfer of 
goods, giving rise to the equity-efficiency trade-off mentioned above, and the 
transmission of ideas or knowledge spillovers, as they are often conveyed or mediated 
by the movements of persons. Moreover, whether better telecommunications increase 
or decrease the area over which spillovers materialize is still an open empirical 
question (Gaspar and Glaeser, 1996). 
  
When the model is enriched to consider the existence of congestion costs, multiple 
equilibria arise, with in particular the possibility of the economy being in a good state 
with high growth, low spatial concentration and low inequality, or conversely in a bad 
state with low growth, high spatial concentration and high inequality. In that case, 
both policies that facilitate technological spillovers and those that improve 
infrastructure in the poor region have the potential to improve growth and reduce 
inequality. 
 
At that stage, it is also interesting to note that new economic geography models help 
substantiate the claim that active infrastructure policy is a form of industrial policy. 
Indeed, different types of investments have effects on economic activity that go 
primarily through their impact on industrial specialization and (co-)agglomeration 
patterns.22 In that sense, they might be a way to do industrial policy without having to 
make choices regarding potential winning sectors, instead relying on market 
dynamics. 
 
Finally, a key aspect to this policy discussion is the fact that given the nature of the 
models at hand, very non-linear effects are to be expected. Because of the circular 
causality inducing agglomeration effects, policies will have very little effects until 
specific thresholds are reached and very strong effects beyond these. For example, 
convergence between a poor and a rich region will require that infrastructures in the 
poor region improve beyond a given level, while investment in roads facilitating trade 
between these regions may trigger strong divergence once it drives trade costs below 
a given level. 
 
This generates a number of problems when trying to draw practical policy 
conclusions. If one accepts the basic logic of these models, identifying the right level 
of the thresholds may proved to be a daunting empirical task. If such thresholds 
indeed exist, but are hard to identify, large amount of resources may be spent with 
little results. Similarly, if these effects interact, so that for example policies have 
implications at the same time for inter- and intra-regional transport costs, policies may 
actually have effects opposite to those expected. 
 
Moreover, the models’ key ingredients relevant to infrastructure policy raise a number 
of deeper issues, which we address in what follows. 
                                                 
22 Combes and Lafourcade (2005) indeed show that road infrastructure was only a minor contributor to 
the decline in transport costs in France between 1978 and 1998, but that it was the main force shaping 
the spatial distribution of these gains. 
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In the CP model and its extensions, infrastructure is at best an implicit determinant of 
transport costs, which themselves are modeled in a rather ad hoc way, i.e. as iceberg 
costs proportional to the value of trade. However, transportation is likely to entail 
significant fixed costs, so the assumption of proportionality is not empirically 
warranted.23 This may not be a problem as long as one is interested by results in term 
of agglomeration for given transportation costs, but it seriously limits the potential 
scope of discussion of more detailed infrastructure issues.  
 
Moreover, as discussed in Neary (2001), the CP model hardly allows for an 
appropriate modeling of transportation services considered as an economic sector per 
se, with its aspects of increasing returns, network externalities, etc.24 Indeed, the 
transportation infrastructure has an effect on transport costs of other sectors that goes 
beyond a simple inverse linear relationship and is instead rooted in the industrial 
organization of the sector, its regulation, the different level of linkages with other 
sectors, etc.25 Then, new investments in this type of infrastructure are likely to 
transform the structure of the sector and of the whole economy by affecting the 
pattern of input costs and availability, something that is not readily captured by 
standard economic geography models. 
 
This is compounded by the fact that space is in general modeled in a rather sketchy 
way, consisting most of the time of two points, and in more sophisticated extensions 
of three points along a line, or of a continuous distribution of firms along either a line 
or a circle. This general criticism of economic geography model is especially 
worrying when one intends to use the theoretical framework to think about transport 
infrastructure, with the strong relevance of its geographic architecture.  
 
Baldwin et al. (2003) improve on the traditional 2-points models by including into the 
model the parameterization of intra-regional transport costs, i.e. a measure of how 
costly it is to transport goods within regions. This allows for a distinction between 
traditional inter-regional transport costs, linked for example to the quality and 
availability of national roads, and local transport costs that can proxy for the quality 
and availability of more local aspect of infrastructure (local roads, bridges, etc.). Most 
of the policy conclusions discussed above rely on this framework. 
 
The three-points-line framework may allow for conclusions relevant to some specific 
contexts where regional development is indeed close to such a pattern, such as Nepal 
(see Jacoby, 1999) or Papua New Guinea (Gibson and Rozelle, 2003), although the 
real issue in these cases seem to be one of access of remote points to the main roads 
rather than of development of the road itself. Alternatively, the “hub-and-spoke” 
framework has been explored by theory, with the result that better infrastructure may 
reinforce agglomeration in the hub, while exacerbating disparities with spoke regions 
(Puga, 2001).  
                                                 
23 Hummels (2007), Hummels and Skiba (2004), Combes and Lafourcade (2005). 
24 Rioja (2003), and Bougheas et al. (1999) also model infrastructure and transport cost in a general 
equilibrium framework, although not an economic geography one, but again their frameworks are 
restricted to a linear inverse relationship between these costs and the amount invested in building or 
maintaining transport networks. 
25 See for example Fernald (1999). Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2007) discuss the relationship between 
agglomeration and industrial coagglomeration patterns. 
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Finally, another question is how to consider other dimensions of infrastructure that 
arguably have crucial implications for some of the key elements of the model, such as 
electricity, which supply is crucial for firms’ productivity, water, which is both an 
input for firms and a key consumption good for households, therefore having an 
impact among others on the cost-of-living dimension, and telecommunications. 
Regarding the latter, Baldwin et al. (2003) suggest that it may be proxied for by the 
degree of learning localization, in the sense that a better telecommunication 
infrastructure would allow spillovers between firms to span a larger geographical 
area. I return to the discussion of this aspect in the next section. 
Urban Economics and the Role of Cities 
 
While this is to some extent a distinct literature, the study of urbanization, cities and 
growth should also provide interesting elements to incorporate in a discussion on the 
role of infrastructure policies in the context of development.26 Indeed, most of the 
development-induced processes of urbanization result in large pressure being put on 
local city infrastructure services. However, as stressed by Henderson (2005), formal 
models that endogenize transport costs and the spatial structure both across and within 
cities meaningfully by considering infrastructure investment are still needed. 
 
One aspect on which relatively little theoretical insights are available is what happens 
in the process of development. Is it the case, as first conjectured by Jeffrey 
Williamson (1965), that low-income countries first experience a process of 
concentration, industrialization and regional divergence and then, as congestion 
becomes more important in the main cities, a reversed path of deconcentration and 
regional convergence, sustained by regional investment and development? How 
important to such a story is the presumption often found in economic geography 
models that market failures lead to too big cities, both because of standard 
agglomeration forces and of political economy arguments? Implicit here is the idea 
that infrastructure investment is at first lagging and follows rather than precedes 
development, but when a certain stage of is reached, investment in infrastructure 
outside the main cities could literally pave the way for the deconcentration of the 
economy. We discuss the available empirical evidence that seems to support these 
views in the next section. 
 
This discussion has very important implications in terms of policy priorities. In 
particular, it indicates that it may be optimal to invest massively in city infrastructure 
at low-income levels while concentration happens, to avoid jeopardizing growth 
prospects, for example by limiting cities’ capacity to attract investment (including 
from foreign sources). Additionally, given rapid rural-urban migration at that stage 
and the strong increase in urban concentration, such a policy is likely to have high 
welfare and poverty-mitigating payoffs. At some point, though, a shift toward 
measures aimed at connecting inner cities to their outside areas with large road and 
railroad corridors, telecommunications, etc., may be necessary to induce 
deconcentration. 
 
                                                 
26 See Henderson (2005) for a survey on Urbanization and growth, and Fujita and Thisse (2002) for a 
synthesis integrating this literature with the new economic geography models. 
 15
A number of additional issues arise in this context. First, determining the optimal 
concentration level and the right timing to shift resources from cities to outside areas 
is easier said than done. Moreover, infrastructure policies are not applied in a vacuum, 
so they need to be coordinated with other (possibly non-spatial) policies, like benefits 
to certain groups that are not evenly distributed across space and will therefore 
interact with spatial policies. Finally, this raises the larger question of whether there is 
a given remoteness threshold above which it is better to move people to jobs than 
move jobs to people. 
3.    Main Lessons from Theory 
It is useful to briefly summarize how the insights from the growth theory and the 
economic geography literatures relate to the two sets of issues that we have 
highlighted in the introduction. Note also that while in most cases the original 
discussion is framed in terms of quantities of infrastructure, most of the discussion 
above can easily be reinterpreted in terms of quality in the sense that what matters is 
the level of services provided by given levels of infrastructure stocks. 
Linkages between Infrastructure and Growth 
 
Most of the channels highlighted in the context of growth theory sustain a link 
between infrastructure stocks (or their variations) and economic growth. This is of 
course the case of the direct productivity channel, which capture the impact of an 
increase in the quantity of infrastructure capital on the productivity of other factors. 
 
Several of the potential indirect channels implied by growth theory also rely on the 
impact of more/better infrastructure on the productivity of other factors: private 
capital in the case of adjustment costs and some instances of economies of scale and 
scope, labor in the case of human development and labor productivity. 
 
Issues such as the relevance of infrastructure spending at different stages of 
development or its role in facilitating convergence within or across countries are 
standard questions in the growth framework, but they also open to a number of 
problems such as the relevance of steady-state behavior versus transition dynamics, 
the optimal (dis)aggregation level, etc. We return to these problems when discussing 
empirical contributions. 
 
The new economic geography framework is also mostly concerned with the link 
between infrastructure stocks and economic activity, although it explicitly adds an 
additional intermediate dimension, namely the spatial distribution of agents (firms and 
possibly labor) and assets. As such, it predicts a joint outcome in terms of growth and 
spatial inequality. 
Composition, Sequencing and Efficiency of Alternative Investments 
 
The theory bearing on these issues is far patchier, although not inexistent. The 
discussion can be grouped around three issues: 1) the composition of infrastructure 
investments (new investments vs. maintenance; operational vs. capital expenditures; 
private vs. public investment); 2) sequencing; 3) the relevance of different sub-
sectors.  
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We discuss briefly the material related to point 1) below. On the other hand, we 
postpone the discussion of points 2) and 3) until the empirical section, as very few 
relevant theory exists on these topics. As for sequencing of reforms, is often referred 
to as an important issue in contexts where the strategy to generate infrastructure 
investments includes market based reforms such as privatization, introduction of 
competition and regulatory innovations. Some theoretical contributions have analyzed 
the link between ownership and efficiency.27 However, so far their insights still have 
to be linked formally to the type of development outcomes of concern here. Similarly, 
growth model do not usually distinguish investments in different sub-sectors, defining 
instead “public capital” as a generic infrastructure good entering the production 
function. As for economic geography, it usually deals with transport infrastructure. As 
hinted in the discussion above, some dimensions included in the models can implicitly 
be related to other sectors, e.g. water and electricity to the cost-of-living aspects, the 
degree of localization of spillovers to telecommunications, etc. However, a more 
detailed integration of these aspects in the economic geography framework is still on 
the agenda. 
 
Composition  
 
As stressed when reviewing indirect channels in the growth framework, the new 
investment vs. maintenance debate has been addressed analytically in this context. It 
is not surprising that the conclusion of most models is that the balance between both 
types of expenditures is likely to depart from the optimal one. The weakness of these 
contributions, however, is that the reasons leading to this result (whether on the 
financing side or linked to the pork-barrel arguments) are generally assumed from the 
start rather than derived from more primitive aspects of the situation under study. An 
important topic for further theoretical research is therefore the potential to generate 
adequate incentives for politicians to revert the biases uncovered here. 
 
As mentioned, this debate is also closely linked to the one on operational vs. capital 
expenditures. One reason for that is the fact that the OPEX/CAPEX balance is likely 
to be crucially influenced by the amount of relative maintenance expenditures. In 
essence, growth models imply that lower than optimal levels of maintenance 
expenditures will generate higher operational costs, both to run the infrastructure 
facilities and for private capital goods that rely on them. But again, they do not offer 
differentiated predictions according to initial conditions or sectors. 
 
                                                 
27 See for example Riordan (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Schmidt (1996) and Martimort and 
Straub (2006). 
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III. Empirics 
 
This section reviews the available empirical evidence on the link between 
infrastructure and development outcomes. Following the structure of the theoretical 
section, it does so by looking first at macro-level contributions, then turning to 
analyses that explicitly integrate a spatial dimension. Finally, it also provides an 
overview of micro-econometric studies touching upon the issue of infrastructure. The 
objective is to assess the suitability of the type of data used, the strengths and 
weaknesses of each technique, and the specific econometric issues that they raise, 
keeping always in mind the ultimate objective of deriving practical policy 
implications. 
1. General Literature Review 
In addition to reviewing these contributions, an overall assessment of the literature is 
intended based on the analysis of 140 specifications from 64 papers between 1989 and 
2007, looking in details at the type of data used, the level of aggregation, the 
technique, the nature of the sample, etc. Of the 64 contribution reviewed, 43 (67%) 
were published in peer-reviewed outlets, while 21 (33%) were not.28 Of course, this is 
not an exhaustive coverage of the relevant literature, which is probably at least ten 
times as large, and it cannot be claimed to be a random selection either. Before going 
on, we summarize a few general lessons from this analysis. 
 
Table 1 
Technique      
Prod fn Cross-country 
Cost 
function 
Growth 
Accounting 
Household 
survey data Others* 
69 29 13 4 7 18 
49.3% 20.7% 9.3% 2.9% 5.0% 12.9% 
Dependent 
variable      
Output Growth Productivity Others**   
67 24 18 31   
47.9% 17.1% 12.9% 22.1%   
Independent 
variable      
Public capital 
expenditures 
Physical 
indicators     
65 75     
46.4% 53.6%     
* Firm-level regressions, assets prices… 
** Poverty, inequality, investment, asset prices… 
 
In terms of techniques used, Table 1 shows that macro-econometric techniques have 
largely dominated the field. Among these, specifications based on the estimation of 
some version of a production function represent half of our sample, followed in 
                                                 
28 Journals include the American Economic Review, the Journal of Monetary Economics, the Review 
of Economics and Statistics, the Journal of Development Economics, the Annals of Regional Science 
among others. 
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frequency by cross-country regressions (21%), cost function estimations (9%) and 
growth accounting techniques (3%). On the other hand, micro-level specifications 
using either household data or firm-level data sum up to approximately 18% of the 
total. 
 
What is the global picture coming out of the research surveyed here? Overall, 63% of 
the specifications find a positive and significant link between infrastructure and some 
development outcome, while 31% find no significant effect and only 6% find a 
negative and significant relationship. Before discussing in more details the 
characteristics of these studies, two facts are worth noting. 
 
First, contrary to what might be expected, there does not seem to be a bias towards 
publishing positive results, as the frequency of positive and significant results is 
actually lower in the sub-sample of published paper (58%). Of course, the possibility 
that this results from a selection bias when including papers in this review cannot be 
totally excluded, although no such explicit selection rule was used. 
 
Second, the type of infrastructure proxies used by researchers interested in 
infrastructure has evolved in the last two decades. While most of the papers in the 
field at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s used some form of public 
capital figures (public investment), the limitations of this type of data, together with 
the growing availability of alternative infrastructure proxies such as physical 
indicators, has led to a move towards this second type of data. Indeed, while in the 
period 1989 to 1999 (65 specifications), the proportion of papers using public capital 
proxies is 72% against 28% using physical indicators, between 2000 and 2007 (75 
specifications), the figures are reversed to only 24% using public capital data and 76% 
using some form of physical indicators.29 
 
Looking now in more details, Table 2 shows the distribution of results from the 
studies under review depending on a number of characteristics. Historically, the 
literature has first been oriented to developed countries studies, mostly because this 
was where data were available and of better quality.30 Where infrastructure problems 
are more acute and policy lessons more needed, however, is clearly in developing 
countries. This has led to a research drive to develop and use developing countries 
data. As a result, while in the period 1989-1999, only 29% of specifications were 
using specific developing countries data (and 20% mixed developed/developing 
samples), between 2000 and 2007, this figure went up to 47% (and 35% of mixed 
sample specifications). 
 
Do results differ depending on the type of sample used? In our sample review, 
developing country data do lead to positive results slightly more often, but the 
difference is small (5%), while mixed sample are more often inconclusive, an 
outcome probably related to some fundamental heterogeneity across observational 
units (most of these studies use country-level data). 
 
                                                 
29 The suitability and limitations of each type of data is discussed in more details in the next section. 
30 A large part of this literature corresponds to the US cross-state public capital literature. 
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Table 2 (number of specifications in parentheses) 
 -1 0 1 
Overall results (140) 5.7% (8) 31.4% (44) 62.9% (88) 
Sample type    
Developed (47) 6.4% 31.9% 61.7% 
Developing (54) 7.4% 25.9% 66.7% 
Mixed (39) 2.6% 38.5% 59.0% 
Dependent variable    
Output (67) 1.5% 44.8% 53.7% 
Output growth (24) 16.7% 29.2% 54.2% 
Productivity (18) 5.6% 27.8% 66.7% 
Other * (31) 6.5% 6.5% 87.1% 
Independent variable    
Public Capital (65) 10.8% 40.0% 49.2% 
Physical Indicator (75) 1.3% 24.0% 74.7% 
Public capital    
Aggregate (48) 12.5% 41.7% 45.8% 
Transport (9) 11.1% 33.3% 55.6% 
Telecom (4) 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Energy (1) 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Water (3) 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Physical indicators    
Electricity (20) 0.0% 30.0% 70.0% 
Roads (27) 0.0% 18.5% 81.5% 
Telecom (17) 0.0% 29.4% 70.6% 
Water (2) 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Sanitation (2) 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 
Synthetic (6) 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 
Other (1) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Theoretical framework    
Prod function (69) 2.9% 36.2% 60.9% 
Cross-country reg (29) 13.8% 37.9% 48.3% 
Cost function (13) 7.7% 15.4% 76.9% 
Growth accounting (4) 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 
Other (Firm-level survey) (18) 5.6% 27.8% 66.7% 
household survey data (7) 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Aggregation level    
Country (81) 4.9% 35.8% 59.3% 
State / region / district (35) 5.7% 34.3% 60.0% 
Industry (9) 11.1% 22.2% 66.7% 
Firms /households (15) 6.7% 6.7% 86.7% 
* Poverty, inequality, individual income, child height, asset or product prices, exports, investment, etc. 
 
Different types of dependent variables have been used, the main ones being output, 
growth and productivity. Only about half of the analyses using either out put or output 
growth have produced conclusive positive results, while about two thirds of the 
studies trying to explain productivity have done so. Finally, studies using some 
alternative dependent variable (see table footnote) have been much more successful in 
proving a positive association between infrastructure and development outcomes. 
 
An important question that has been addressed in the literature is to determine the 
more appropriate proxies for infrastructure. These have either been some measure of 
public capital (i.e. investment in infrastructure, generally from public sources 
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although not exclusively) or physical indicators. The early literature using aggregate 
measures of public capital stocks has been unable to uncover a positive link between 
infrastructure and outcome variables in more than half of the cases. As mentioned 
above, the literature has gradually shifted to the use of physical indicators and this 
move has coincided with papers reporting more positive results. 
 
There are at least two reasons why public capital figures are not very good proxies for 
infrastructure, or to put it differently, why infrastructure is not “public” capital.31 
First, a significant part of investment in infrastructure is made by the private sector. 
For example, in 7 Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru), private investment represented 16.4% of total 
investment in the period 1980-85, and 62.9% in 1996-2001 (Fay and Morrison, 2007). 
Because the trends in public versus private investment in sectors such as 
transportation, electricity or telecommunications have responded to a number of 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants, both at the national and international 
level, it should be obvious that measuring infrastructure stocks using only public 
investment figures introduces systematic measurement errors and renders most 
estimations unreliable. 
 
An even more serious problem is that even if we could use total public and private 
investment in infrastructure sectors, there are serious reasons to think that stock 
figures computed from investment flows do not reflect effective infrastructure stocks 
and the level of services that they provide. The main reason for that is the fact that, 
especially in developing countries, the official costs of investments are often 
disconnected from their effective value, mostly because of governmental 
inefficiencies or institutional weaknesses (see Pritchett, 1996 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
 
The second and related point already discussed in the theoretical section above is that 
infrastructure is often not a pure public good. In part because of its private sector 
origin, it is increasingly taking a private good nature and its services are being priced. 
The flow of services that accrue to private operators like firms is therefore more 
relevant than the stock of infrastructure capital, however well it is measured. 
 
These shortcomings have to some extent been responsible for the trend towards 
physical indicators. However, to date physical infrastructure proxies suffer from three 
main problems. First, there are not systematically available across suitable 
geographical units and time. Second, the indicators currently used are often relatively 
bad proxies of the services they are supposed to capture. Third, the quality dimension 
of infrastructure services, which appears crucial to private operators, is almost 
completely absent from these indicators. 
 
Finally, does the level of aggregation of data have an impact on the results? Although 
the trend is not overwhelming, it seems that results become more positive as we move 
towards a more disaggregated level. This is particularly clear when one looks at 
results from household-survey and firm-based survey based studies. In what follows, 
                                                 
31 The issue of the choice of indicators is discussed in more details in Straub (2007). 
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we discuss more specifically the macro-level literature, before turning to studies 
inspired by the new geographic literature and finally micro-econometric ones. 
 
2. Macro-Level Empirical Studies 
Issues and Conclusions 
 
Of the 64 papers (140 specifications) included in the review, 48 papers (116 
specifications) can be considered to be macro-econometric ones, i.e. either based on 
cross-country, cross-state or cross-region data. As discussed in Straub (2007), an 
inherent weakness of the macro-empirical literature has been the lack of clearly 
defined questions or issues to be tested. Following the taxonomy of relevant questions 
defined there, Table 3 shows that the overwhelming majority of the macro-level 
studies have limited themselves to comparing the elasticity of infrastructure capital 
and that of private capital. Moreover, a closer review of the papers shows that this is 
often a “default” option, in the sense that no real theoretical model motivates the 
empirical tests.  
 
What types of results have come out of these exercises? A first generation of papers, 
including the well-known one by Aschauer (1989), produced very large estimates for 
the elasticity of infrastructure capital, between 0.20 and 0.40, mostly looking at public 
capital stocks in the context of US states.32 Aschauer’s estimates imply marginal 
returns such that infrastructure investment pays for itself in approximately one year 
(Gramlich, 1994). More recent studies have also generated large estimates. For 
example, Duggall, Saltzman and Klein (1999) find an elasticity of 0.27, very similar 
to Aschauer’s. An often cited paper by Röllers and Waverman (2001), published in 
the American Economic Review, concludes, looking at OECD countries in the period 
1970-1990, that a 1% increase in telecom penetration rate implies +0.045 % increase 
in GDP, which implies for example an additional compounded annual rate of 1.2% for 
Germany and that one third of the average OECD growth over these 20 years period 
can be attributed to telecom expansion. Similarly, Calderón and Servén (2004) state 
that if Latin American countries' infrastructure stocks were to catch up with the 
regional leader (Costa Rica), they would get additional growth of between 1.1 and 4% 
per year and would reduce their GINI coefficient by between 0.02 and 0.10.  
 
Table 3 
Questions tested (total number of specifications=116)  
Compare elasticity of infrastructure and private capital (108) 93.1% 
Direct vs. indirect effects of infrastructure (8) 6.9% 
Infrastructure-related vs. other externalities (7) 6.0% 
Permanent vs. transitory effects (40) 34.5% 
of which: cross-country (22) 19.0% 
Others (18) 15.5% 
Determination of optimal stock (6) 5.2% 
Characterization of network effects (9) 7.8% 
Effects of maintenance vs. new Investment (3) 2.6% 
Note: see Straub (2007) for a discussion of the classification used here. 
                                                 
32 Examples include Ford and Poret (1991), Munnel (1990) and Berndt and Hansson (1994) inter alia. 
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Such large estimates have often been considered as unrealistic and have triggered a 
large amount of subsequent research, looking at different samples or refining the 
techniques used. 
 
As discussed in the theoretical section above, the fact that infrastructure-related 
capital can be both a public good, an input in the production of other intermediate 
inputs, and a productivity-shifting force raises a number of additional empirical 
questions. These include first the disentangling of direct (the first two channels above) 
versus indirect effects (the third channel), and within these indirect effects the 
characterization of the part responding strictly to infrastructure. As is apparent from 
table 3, a very limited amount of research has been devoted to these questions, mostly 
in the context of growth accounting studies. Notwithstanding the difficulties, already 
mentioned, involved in attributing a price to infrastructure capital to determine its 
share of output, Hulten and Schwab (2000) and Hulten et al. (2005) have developed a 
methodology to overcome that issue and find transport and energy infrastructure to 
account for an important part of TFP growth in India, while no such effect is found in 
the US case. Duggall et al. (1999, 2007) develop an alternative methodology based on 
29 and 26 years of US data respectively. They find a large infrastructure elasticity, 
similar to that of Aschauer (1989), and conclude that the effect of infrastructure is 
partly dependent on the presence of other technologies. Replicating their methodology 
in the context of developing countries, however, would require data much beyond 
what is currently available. 
 
An important conclusion of Duggall et al. (2007) is that public capital, through a 
combination of its direct and indirect effects, has the potential to generate increasing 
returns to scale at the aggregate level, thereby implying a permanent increase in the 
growth rate. Setting aside simple cross-country regressions that by nature imply the 
estimation of the long run growth rate, this issue, of particular policy relevance, has 
been little addressed in the literature. Canning (1999) and Canning and Pedroni 
(2004) use unit root and cointegration tests in the context of country level panel data 
as a way to assess long run effects. Additionally, these contributions highlight the fact 
that the issue of transitory versus permanent effects is closely linked to the question of 
identifying optimal infrastructure stocks. Indeed, Canning and Pedroni (2004) 
conclude that positive (resp. negative) long run effects are characteristic of an above-
optimal (resp. below-optimal) infrastructure stock. Alternatively, Aschauer (2000) 
assess the optimality of US states infrastructure stocks by assuming a reference 
steady-state optimal output elasticity of 0.30. His conclusions, however, are subject to 
doubt both because this elasticity, in line with his previous results, appears very large 
and because he fails to account for the potential reverse causation between output and 
infrastructure. 
 
More fundamentally, it appears that macro-level data on aggregate stocks of 
infrastructure, be it public capital figures or physical indicators, are by nature not 
adequate to capture the notion of optimality of infrastructure stocks. Indeed, the 
spatial nature of infrastructure implies that a given aggregate stock, for example a 
number of telephone connections or of kilometers of road, can be either optimal or 
grossly inadequate depending on the way it is distributed across geographical and 
individual units. We discuss this point further in the next section on the geographical 
empirical evidence, but an illustration of this is found in Cadot et al. (2005), who 
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show, using French regional data, that infrastructure investment decisions are often 
politically driven and are therefore likely to depart from efficiency considerations. 
Main Methodological Issues 
 
The main problem that has plagued early studies and has been deemed responsible for 
the sometimes unrealistic results displayed is the potential endogeneity of 
infrastructure indicators. Such endogeneity has three main origins.33 First, 
measurement error problems have already been discussed above and the main 
conclusion is that they seriously weaken the case for using public capital figures as 
proxy for infrastructure. 
 
The second issue is that of potential unobserved effects or omitted variables. 
Unobserved effects arise if specific geographical units, countries or regions, have 
characteristics that lead them both to have higher performance (growth, productivity, 
etc.) and to invest more in infrastructure and if these aspects are unobserved to the 
econometrician. In most cases, it is plausible that some of these unobserved effects 
are time invariant, so the issue may be addressed with fixed effects estimation 
techniques in the context of panel data. Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Garcia-Milà et al. 
(1996) revisit the evidence on US states and find that once fixed effects are accounted 
for, no significant effect of public capital remains. Table 4 indeed shows that panel 
data specifications incorporating fixed effects do find negative or inconclusive results 
much more often. 
 
Table 4 
  Results  
 -1 0 1 
Fixed effects    
No (41) 2.4% 22.0% 75.6% 
Yes (47) 8.5% 40.4% 51.1% 
 
It may also the case that omitted factors are time varying ones, in which case 
instrumental variables are needed. Straub (2007) discusses how instrumental variables 
may be constructed using data about policy in neighboring countries or state.  
 
Finally, perhaps the more serious problem is that of reverse causation, and indeed it is 
often argued that the large estimates obtained by early papers were due to the neglect 
of this issue. This has mainly been addressed by using lagged values of the 
independent variables as instruments, a less than perfect solution in the context of the 
relatively small samples that characterize infrastructure studies. Romp and de Haan 
(2005) survey the macro-econometric literature and indicate that when reverse 
causation considerations were taken into account, the magnitude of estimates was 
approximately reduced to one third of Aschauer’s initial estimates, an indication of 
the importance of the issue. Cost function studies have also been used in an attempt to 
go around this problem, but they are in principle more suited to industry-level data 
and long panel because of their very data-demanding nature (see discussion in Romp 
and de Haan, 2005). 
                                                 
33 See Wooldridge (2002) for more details. 
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Policy Implications 
 
To close this section, it is important to form an overall assessment of the contribution 
of the macro-level empirical literature. Three main conclusions emerge. First, this 
literature has been plagued by numerous methodological issues that have often 
clouded the robustness of the conclusions, and despite numerous efforts to overcome 
endogeneity problems, it is not clear that it has succeeded. Pande and Udry (2006) 
illustrate clearly, in the context of another literature, namely the macro-level empirical 
literature on the link between institutional quality and development, some of the 
limitations of aggregate data. One aspect that is relevant to infrastructure proxies is 
the fact that, as long as the variables used to capture some dimension of infrastructure 
are in fact aggregates of different underlying aspects with separate causal relationship 
with the outcome of interest, the aggregate estimated effect will depend on the 
arbitrary weights used to define the right-hand side proxy. This is especially relevant 
for public capital proxy, but may also affect physical indicators as long as they are 
defined in a way that make them distinct from the real flow of services that 
households or firms receive. For example, Torero and von Braun (2006) show that 
rural households in Bangladesh use telephony for a large number of reasons, 
including business issues, land transaction, family/friend relationships, remittances, 
emergency news, etc., each of which may connect through different pathways to 
economic activity. Aggregating all of these into a simple indicator such as the number 
of telephone connections may give rise to the problem discussed above. 
 
Second, even when studies have been technically sound, they have suffered from 
inescapable limitations due to the nature of data. Infrastructure capital stocks are 
inadequate proxies to the growing private nature of infrastructure services, while 
physical indicators are still too coarse to really capture the flow of services to 
households and firms, and optimal stocks are unlikely to be ever identifiable at the 
aggregation level of regions or countries.  
 
Moreover, as discussed extensively in Straub (2007), key aspects that influence the 
efficiency of infrastructure sectors, such as the nature of the regulatory framework, 
the identity of operators and the nature of the political economy process that drives 
investments, have been almost completely ignored by this literature. While the 
inclusion of such data will not solve the methodological problems discussed above 
when trying to explain development outcomes, they could be used more 
systematically to analyze how the overall provision of infrastructure investments and 
the quality of services is affected by different aspects of the institutional environment, 
the sequencing and overall composition of reforms, etc.34 
 
This leads to the third conclusion, namely the one questioning the policy relevance of 
the macro-level approach. Indeed, with the existing body of accumulated knowledge, 
the problem is not that we do not have significant evidence of a link between 
infrastructure and development outcomes, but rather that most of it is useless in a 
policy perspective. For example a diagnostic of insufficient aggregate transportation 
                                                 
34 For related contributions, see among others Cubbin and Stern (2005), Dal Bo and Rossi (2007), 
Dewatripont and Seabright (2005), Estache and Rossi (2005), Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003, 
2006), Henisz and Zelner (2004), Laffont (2005), Maskin and Tirole (2006), Rauch (1995) Robinson 
and Torvik (2005), Wallsten (2001) and World Bank (2004). 
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infrastructure in a given country might be warranted, but it leaves open the question 
of the exact types and location of investments, new freeways or rural roads, bridges, 
railways, maintenance versus new investment, etc., that should be prioritized.  
 
Faced with these limitations, two routes appear attractive. The traditional one is to 
come back to microeconometric empirical assessments of specific projects or 
instances of infrastructure development. A more recent approach is to explicitly 
incorporate the lessons from the new economic geography literature in the empirical 
exercise. We review attempts along this line in the next section before looking at 
more traditional microeconometric studies. 
 
3. Empirical Economic Geographic Studies 
 
Empirical evidence on the role of infrastructure in the context of the economic 
geography frameworks mentioned above can be organized in three strands. First of 
all, I review generic evidence on the theoretical mechanisms underlying these models, 
namely agglomeration forces, transport costs and the volume of trade.  
 
In a nutshell, two crucial steps need to be integrated to incorporate spatial insights 
into the discussion of the development impact of infrastructure policies. First of all, 
the nature of the link between infrastructure and transport costs need to be made 
explicit, so that we can estimate the impact of new investment, maintenance or 
upgrading of existing networks on these costs. Second, we need to be able to estimate 
how changes in transport costs will affect trade and agglomeration of firms and 
workers, and ultimately what their effect on a number of outcomes such as growth or 
income distribution will be. 
  
I then turn to papers looking at the relationship between infrastructure and 
development outcomes by linking the two steps outlined above. I review them in two 
groups. Those that implicitly incorporate geography by testing the effect of 
infrastructure on the spatial variations of some variable of interest, generally prices of 
land, houses or labor, and those that explicitly introduce geographical variables in the 
analysis. 
Generic Evidence 
 
As stated when discussing theory, most of the discussion of infrastructure in the 
context of new economic geography models is based on the assumption that 
investments in transport infrastructure reduce trade costs and facilitate trade. This first 
raises the issue of how to measure transport costs. 
 
Measuring Transport Costs with a View on Infrastructure Policy 
 
Traditional methods have focused on simple proxies such as distance, ad valorem 
shares of trade values (predominantly the cif/fob ratio, which compares the cost-
insurance-freight value of a good at the point of entry into the importing country to 
the free-on-board value at the point of shipment for exportation), or real freight 
expenditures.   
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First of all, as summarized in Henderson, Shalizi and Venables (2001), transport costs 
in many developing region of the world are far from negligible. For example, the 
costs measured by the cif/fob ratio can rise to 30 to 40% for remote landlocked 
countries. The impact on trade is also very important. Using distance as a proxy for 
transport costs, these authors report that doubling costs reduces trade volume by 80% 
and that the median landlocked country has 60% trade less than the median coastal 
country, a finding partly due to the fact that land transport is approximately seven 
times more costly than sea transport. 
 
Using a gravity model of trade with either transport costs or cif/fob ratios, Limao & 
Venables (2001) show that, on top of distance, infrastructure matters strongly. Indeed, 
in such a model distance alone explains approximately 10% of transport costs, while 
including infrastructure variables increases the pseudo-R2 to 50%. More precisely, 
improving a country’s infrastructure stock from the median to the top 25th percentile 
would reduce the cif/fob ratio from 1.28 to 1.11, a change equivalent to the country 
getting 2,358km closer to all its trading partners. Conversely, deterioration from the 
median to the 75th percentile would increase the cif/fob ratio from 1.28 to 1.40, an 
increase equivalent to getting 2,016km further away from all trading partners. 
Similarly, Bougheas et al. (1999) estimate a gravity model of trade applied to EU 
countries, using both the stock of public capital and the length of the motorway 
network, and show that infrastructure is a significant determinant of trade volumes. 
 
Similar evidence is found for African countries in Limao & Venables (2001), who 
estimate that intra-African transport costs are higher (136%) and trade volumes are 
lower (6%) than predicted by a standard gravity model, much of this corresponding to 
poor infrastructure (e.g. 59% of the total for costs) and the very high cost of distance. 
Moreover, an interesting element in that paper is the recognition of non-linear effects 
in the case where transit countries with very poor infrastructure virtually “kill” trade. 
 
There is however an issue with the quality of transport costs proxies, which seriously 
limits the inferences that one can draw regarding the impact of specific infrastructure 
development policies.35 First of all, cif/fob measures appear to do a relatively bad job 
at explaining the link between distance and transport costs. Moreover, by 
construction, they are limited to inter-country trade and do not allow for intra-country 
data, a serious problem when the objective is to assess the impact of regional 
infrastructure policy for example. As for distance, the main problem is that usual 
measures do not allow for the decomposition of the sources of variations in transport 
costs resulting from changes in the environment such as new investment in 
infrastructure, technological or regulatory changes. Indeed, Combes and Lafourcade 
(2005), after developing a more sophisticated measure, which I detail below, show 
that while simple time or distance measures do relatively well in a cross-section 
setting, they very imperfectly capture variations in transport costs in a time-series 
perspective, a particularly preoccupying feature when it comes to policy evaluations. 
 
Using GIS data on the French road sector, as well as distance and time aspects of 
traffic conditions, transport technology and market structure of the transport industry, 
                                                 
35 See Combes and Lafourcade (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the criteria that good transport 
cost measures should satisfy. 
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they develop a measure of Generalized Transport Costs (GTC) that satisfies a number 
of desirable requirements, and in particular allows for the decomposition of the 
variations of these costs into a number of components including infrastructure, fuel 
price, technology and regulation. The striking conclusion is that while the 
deregulation of the road transport industry was the main driver of the reduction in 
GTC, explaining 57% of the decrease against only 8% for infrastructure, the spatial 
distribution of this variation in costs was mostly mediated by infrastructure 
developments that allowed for the targeting of specific regions.36 
 
Agglomeration Patterns and Outcomes 
 
A related issue is the pattern of geographic industrial concentration, which I identified 
as an intermediate objective in the theoretical discussion. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) 
test an array of factors explaining industrial concentration in the US, among which a 
number of proxy for the quality of infrastructure services: prices of electricity and 
proxies for transport costs. Both of these appear to have a significant impact on firms’ 
location decisions. Using coagglomeration patterns to disentangle further between the 
different theoretical mechanisms that may drive agglomeration, Ellison, Glaeser and 
Kerr (2007) find support for transport costs savings secured by locating near 
consumers and suppliers, for labor market externalities and for knowledge spillovers.  
 
Additionally, some authors have provided evidence of the dynamics of agglomeration, 
dispersion and re-agglomeration that may occur at the industrial level and of the role 
of pioneer firms in that process (Kim, 1995; Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser, 2002; 
Hanson, 1996). Dumais et al. (2002) provide the most sophisticated such analysis. In 
particular, they link geographic concentration and the changes thereof to firms’ life 
cycle, distinguishing between the effect of new firms’ birth, expansion or contraction 
of existing firms, plant closures, and plants switching between industries. They 
conclude that mobility is rife, both among concentrated and non-concentrated 
industries, a fact that they interpret as proof of concentration being an equilibrium 
outcome determined by industry characteristics. They also conclude that firms’ births 
tend to reduce concentration, while closures increase it. 
 
How do these (co)agglomeration patterns relate to growth and income distribution? 
Overall, apart some suggestive aggregate evidence37, there is no definitive evidence 
on the link between agglomeration and growth. The first issue here is whether there is 
an excessive or suboptimal degree of agglomeration. As signaled in the theoretical 
discussion, models allow for both outcomes so this is ultimately an empirical matter. 
Related evidence is found in urban empirical analysis. Using cross-country data on 
city concentration, Henderson (1999) finds that there is a best degree of urban 
concentration (also called primacy) that maximizes productivity growth by balancing 
benefits (local knowledge spillovers) and costs (congestion, cost of life in mega-
cities).38 His estimations indicate that one standard deviation from the best value costs 
                                                 
36 Of course, such conclusion might not be directly transposable to a developing country context, in the 
sense that deregulation may fail to have an impact in a context in which the network is underdeveloped, 
although further research on this aspect is still due. 
37 See for example the introduction in Baldwin and Martin (2004). 
38 According to this paper, over-concentrated countries include Argentina, Chile, Algeria, Mexico, Peru 
and Thailand. 
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1.41% a year in terms of growth.39 As for the process of concentration-
deconcentration that may arise in the process of development, suggestive evidence 
from Brazil and Korea supports the Williamson (1965) view. Indeed, after an initial 
historical phase of concentration that led to the rapid growth of megalopolis like 
Seoul and Sao Paulo, industry appeared to move first to suburban areas and nearby 
satellite cities (say, those located at less than 60km or 1 hour of travel) in search for 
lower wages and land rents. This then created problems of pollution, saturation of 
infrastructure, aggravated by bad land use planning in areas that did not have the 
adequate administrative capacity to face such rapid population growth. In a second 
phase, activity then moved further out to hinterland and rural areas, a process 
sometimes facilitated by infrastructure investment. 
Empirical Evidence in a Spatial Framework 
 
Having discussed the building blocks, we now turn now to analyses that explicitly test 
the impact of infrastructure policy on development outcomes by integrating the 
various aspects. We divide them in two groups, depending on whether they explicitly 
include spatial variables or not. 
 
Models Implicitly Including a Spatial Dimension   
 
Haughwout (2000 and 2002) provide a methodology to indirectly account for the 
spatial implications of public capital investment when testing its effect on 
productivity. These papers propose spatial models that look at the effect of public 
capital on house prices, employment and wages, as a way to incorporate geographic 
mobility effects. Applying a compensating variations method and using US state and 
city level infrastructure and household data on house prices and wages to elicit 
geographic mobility impact, Haughwout (2002) shows that in general the marginal 
effect of infrastructure is positive but low. Infrastructure investments mainly benefit 
households, much less so firms, and the aggregate willingness to pay is less than the 
cost. 
 
Jacoby (2001) represents an example of an application of this method in a developing 
country context. The paper uses household survey and plot value data to examine the 
distributional consequences of rural roads in Nepal, a country characterized for most 
farmers by long and costly travel to reach the main road that leads to market centers. 
It concludes that enabling better access to market does provide important average 
benefits, a 10% increase in travel time to market reduces the value of land by 2.2%, 
but that these benefits are only imperfectly targeted, therefore being “more like a tide 
that lifts all boats rather than a highly effective means of reducing income inequality”. 
  
Models Explicitly Including Spatial Variables 
 
Accessibility studies are an additional building block towards economic outcomes. 
An accessibility indicator aims at measuring, for households and firms at each 
location in a given geographic area, the opportunities available at other locations in 
terms of employment opportunities or market potential. It does so by inversely 
                                                 
39 Note that this does not impede the fact that urbanization may not generate any growth benefits, as 
has been the case in many African countries for example. 
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weighting the sum of some destinations’ indicator (GDP or employment for example), 
by a proxy of the cost involved in reaching them. Obviously, following our discussion 
above, the better the cost measure (ideally some type of GTC), the more significant 
the accessibility index. 
 
A number of contributions exist for Europe (see Combes and Lafourcade, 2005, and 
Spiekermann and Neubauer, 2002, for a methodological survey), and the use of GTC-
like measures allow for an analysis of the role of different components, infrastructure, 
technology, market structure, on the changes in the level and spatial distribution of 
accessibility over time.  
 
These accessibility indicators have been included in empirical analysis of firm-level 
productivity, together with standard determinants such as human capital, technology 
and regulatory measures, as well as additional “first and second nature” proxies 
signaled by the new economic geography literature. Examples for developing 
countries include Deichman, Fay, Koo and Lall (2002) for Southern Mexico, Lall, 
Funderburg and Yepes (2004) for Brazil, Lall, Shalizi and Deichman (2004) for India, 
and Deichmann, Kaiser, Lall and Shalizi (2005) for Indonesia. All these studies find 
that accessibility is a major determinant of firm productivity. For example, 
Deichmann et al. (2002) assess that a 10% improvement in market access would 
increase labor productivity by 6%, this effect being stronger for smaller firms. 
Starting from a gravity model of trade including road distances and road quality 
between 83 African mainland capital and cities of more than 500,000 habitants, Buys, 
Deichman and Wheeler (2006) set out to estimate the potential gains in trade volumes 
that would result from a major upgrading of the continental road network. They 
conclude that a road network upgrading costing less than $50 billion would generate 
trade gains of more than $250 billion over 15 years. 
 
While these studies are clearly a step in the right direction, a major problem arises 
from the fact that the data used in the analysis are in all cases cross-section samples of 
firms. In effect, the conclusion mentioned above amounts to derive a dynamic 
prediction (a 10% improvement would generate 6% productivity gains) from a static 
indicator.  
 
Leaving aside for the moment the difficulty inherent in figuring out the type of 
infrastructure investment that would generate this 10% improvement in market 
access, note that such a jump from static estimators to dynamic policy conclusion is in 
effect negating the very logic on which economic geography models are built. These 
models tell us that firms location decision are affected by transport costs, so firms 
may have decided their location in the past based on (previous) developments of the 
network. If that is true, the resulting estimations might be biased for several reasons. 
 
First, the result of the static model generates estimators for a number of factors 
explaining firms’ location at some point in time. If the underlying spatial distribution 
is an equilibrium phenomenon as assumed in NEG models40, then changes in the 
underlying factors such as infrastructure-related transport costs would imply different 
equilibrium values for the relevant parameters (themselves resulting from a different 
spatial equilibrium distribution). This may be compounded by possible 
                                                 
40 See Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (2002) for supporting evidence. 
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complementarities or substitutability between these factors, as well as by the strongly 
non-linear effects that are at the root of NEG models. Simulations based on static 
estimates, or assuming only smooth linear variations around these estimates may 
therefore be inadequate. 
 
Moreover, the spirit of NEG models tells us that what we observe is not that better 
access makes firms more efficient, but a spatial form of selection bias linked to firms 
locating according to the network’s characteristics. Then, if for example more 
efficient firms are the ones relocating in secondary centers as links are formed, the 
estimates of the impact of market access are likely to be biased upward. A related 
issue is the fact that location decisions also imply simultaneous endogenous 
technological choices, which are partly responsible for the differences in efficiency 
observed across firms, a problem very difficult to address with this type of data. 
Indeed, a Heckit type of procedure might help control for this if technology choices 
are of a 0/1 nature (i.e. deciding to produce or shut-down), but continuous choices 
among technologies with different levels of productivity are more difficult to address. 
 
Finally, an additional issue relates to the potential endogenous placement of specific 
infrastructure. Indeed, the essence of infrastructure policy is to make investments 
where they are likely to have the largest effect. Therefore, evaluating the impact of 
past investments is unlikely to provide reliable estimates for the effect of future 
works. This issue, however, can be tackled provided panel data are available. Some 
“first nature” characteristics, such as geographical aspects, can then be used as 
instruments for the placement of specific infrastructure, which suitability depends on 
local conditions.41 
 
4. Microeconometric Studies 
Some microeconometric contributions have looked into the issue of infrastructure’s 
impact on development outcomes. To mention a few prominent ones, Gibson and 
Rozelle (2003) look at the effect of access to road in Papua New Guinea on poverty at 
the household level, and show that reducing access time to less than three hours where 
it was above this threshold leads to a fall of 5.3% in the head count index. Esther 
Duflo and Rohini Pande (2007) study the effect of irrigation dams in India on 
agricultural production and poverty. Their cost-Benefit analysis suggests that dams 
have very low rate of return and adverse distributional effects. Using Tanzanian 
household survey data, Fan, Nyange and Rao (2005) look at the impact of public 
investment and roads on household level income and poverty and find very positive 
effects, with a ratio of 1 to 9 in the case of public capital investment. Ilahi and 
Grimard (2000) show that the development of water infrastructure has a significant 
impact on women’s time allocation in Pakistan. Thomas and Strauss (1992) analyze 
the determinants of child height in Brazil, a standard development outcome, and 
include electricity, water and sewerage connections as explanatory variables. They 
find the number of electricity connections per capita in the community to be 
positively correlated with height of babies, with a complementary effect of mother 
education. Positive results are also found for water and sanitation, with variations by 
                                                 
41 Duflo and Pande (2007) use GIS data on land inclination to instrument for the endogenous placement 
of dams in India. 
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children age class and level of mother education. Galiani et al. (2006) show that the 
privatization of water in Argentina has significantly reduced the incidence of child 
mortality due to water-borne diseases and that most of this effect has been the result 
of an expansion in household access to the water network. 
 
Another group of studies looks at firm-level data. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) use a 
survey of Ugandan firms to analyze how entrepreneurs cope with deficient public 
capital. They show that faced with unavailable and especially with unpredictable 
services, many firms invest in substitutes such as electricity generators. In that sense, 
poor public capital crowds out private investment. Moreover, in their sample, firms 
that have invested in generators invest less conditionally on public capital turning out 
to be not that bad. Their findings are similar to those coming out of a number of 
reports on investment climate assessments, such as Anas, Lee and Murray (1996) and 
Lee, Anas and Oh (1996) on Indonesia, Nigeria and Thailand, and Alby and Straub 
(2007) on eight Latin American countries. Finally, Jensen (2007) illustrates nicely in 
the context of south Indian fisheries how access to mobile telephony enhances market 
efficiency and welfare of the participants. 
 
While household and firm survey data help solve some of the problem specific to 
macroeconomic data, they also generate some issues of their own. First of all, 
household level data, although they help identify direct effects on human development 
outcomes, also rule out the identification of effects on the economic activities of firms 
not owned at the household level. Moreover, microeconometric data have specific 
endogeneity problems, namely the fact that access variables cannot be considered to 
be exogenously determined. This arise for two reasons: endogenous service 
placement, because public investment decisions are likely to be affected by the 
expected returns and be non-randomly attributed, and endogenous placement of 
households and firms, as for example wealthier households or more skilled 
entrepreneurs may take location decisions based on the potential availability of 
infrastructure services. At the firm level, an alternative version of this last issue is 
endogenous technology choices, whereby firms faced with different quality and 
availability of infrastructure services would choose different technologies.42 
 
The problem of endogenous placement has been addressed in various ways. Gibson 
and Rozelle (2003) take advantage of the fact that highway development occurred 
progressively from coast to inland areas to use the timing of highway penetration in 
each district as an instrument for road density. However, it is clear that this strategy is 
only made possible by the specific geographic characteristics of Papua New Guinea. 
Duflo and Pande (2007) use GIS data on land inclination to instrument for dams 
placement choices. The issue of endogenous technological choices, a crucial one 
when outcomes such as economic activity indicators are considered, poses a greater 
challenge. Haughwout (2002) and Jacoby (2000) circumvent the problem by using 
local prices of either land, houses or labor as dependent variable, under the 
assumption that these prices reflect potential profits resulting among other things from 
infrastructure availability, but are not affected by technological choices. However, as 
signaled by Gibson (2005), it is not clear that any of these assets fully captures the 
present value of future profits, especially in the non-farm sector. 
                                                 
42 An attempt to address this issue in the context of ICA surveys is in Escribano and Guasch (2005). 
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 5. Main Lessons from Empirical Studies 
Coming back to the two set of issues stressed in the introduction, how much do we 
learn from the empirical literature reviewed above? 
Linkages between Infrastructure and Growth 
 
Concerning the link between infrastructure investment and growth, section III.1 above 
provides a summary of the results. In a nutshell, close to two-thirds of the studies 
surveyed here conclude there is a positive and significant link. However, the diversity 
of techniques, indicators, samples and time frames paints a rather confusing picture 
when it comes to answering specific questions of interest to policy makers. 
 
How much spending should be allocated to infrastructure at different stages of 
development? It is fair to say that the literature provides no clear guidelines on this 
issue. Considering the three sectors for which more than a handful of studies are 
reviewed (electricity, road transport and telecommunications), a positive link is more 
often found in developing countries samples than in developed countries or in mixed 
ones. It is hard, however, to go beyond this general statement and in particular to 
provide a numerical assessment of the desired levels of investment, both in and across 
sectors. While in recent years major Latin American countries have invested less than 
3% of GDP on average (Fay and Morrison, 2007), some East Asian countries like 
China and Vietnam are investing around 10% of their GDP in infrastructure (Straub, 
Vellutini and Warlters, 2007). Although some attempts have been made to develop a 
theoretical framework that could help identify these optimal investment levels, this is 
clearly an aspect that requires further research. 43 
 
An additional difficulty stems from the issue of network externalities. Indeed, even if 
we believe the results from some studies that show increased returns to infrastructure 
investment in some sectors (e.g. telecommunications) at higher levels of development, 
should we conclude that LDCs should invest less? 
 
What is the impact of infrastructure investment on development gaps between 
countries, regions within these countries, rural and urban areas, etc.? The review of 
the new economic geography literature shows that this remains an area where major 
empirical developments are due. 
Composition, Sequencing and Efficiency of Alternative Investments 
 
Going beyond spending levels requires addressing the issue of the quality of 
spending. The quality dimension can be linked both to the composition of these 
investments and to the sequencing of the supporting reforms. While we have 
                                                 
43 See Fay and Morrison (2007), appendix B. The simple extrapolation of results from macroeconomic 
estimates provides a simple, but unsatisfactory way to do that, raising a number of issues such as the 
heterogeneity across countries and along the development path, and the relevance of the steady-state 
versus transitional dynamics (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2005, for more details). 
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mentioned above that theory has dealt very little with these issues, some interesting 
insights can be found in the empirical literature. 
 
On the topic of new investment versus maintenance expenditures, little empirical 
evidence is available. While the theory discussed previously suggests a bias toward 
new investments (Rioja, 2003; Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis, 2004), there is an obvious 
need to generate adequate data to assess this issue. Ideally, this means data on both 
infrastructure investments and maintenance expenditures, of the type used in 
Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005) for Canada.  However, this would generate 
compatibility issue with the growing emphasis on physical indicators. 
 
How much maintenance spending is necessary to maintain the integrity of networks 
given demand projections, is probably best addressed in practice by economic-
engineering models that allow identifying maintenance expenditure standards. Fay 
and Morrison (2007) mention standards of 2% of the replacement cost of capital for 
electricity, roads and rail, 3% for water and sanitation and 8% for mobile and fixed 
telephone lines. These expenditures should then be added to projected investment 
needs. However, as mentioned above, while these magnitudes are well known, 
politicians often face incentives that lead them to distort maintenance needs 
downwards. Empirical evaluations of how these distortions are affected by the 
characteristics of the political game and by the nature of the relationships between 
policy makers and financing agencies would be a first step towards understanding 
how the right incentives can be created. 
 
In the context of developing countries and physical infrastructure indicators, 
maintenance can be alternatively approached from the quality side. Hulten (1996) 
uses an effectiveness index of infrastructure in cross-country estimations and reports 
an impact more than seven times larger than that of public capital. Systematic 
assessment of the quality of services could be included in microeconomic surveys, as 
is already partially the case in ICAs. Databases such as ROCKS in the case of road 
construction (see Deichmann, Buys and Wheeler, 2006), can then be used to estimate 
the cost of maintenance expenditures corresponding to given quality improvements 
and compare them to the cost of new investments. 
 
As for empirical insights about the sequencing of reforms supporting infrastructure 
investment, they are mostly found in studies looking at some form of private sector 
involvement in these sectors. In essence, researchers have been concerned with the 
timing of restructuring measures (before or after privatization), the implementation of 
regulation and, if so, the institutional aspects of it, and the potential introduction of 
competition. 
 
The common wisdom seems to be that when some form of privatization is considered, 
restructuring should be undertaken prior to its implementation, a regulatory 
framework should be put in place and supported by institutional arrangements 
including transparency and independence of the agencies in charge, and competition 
should be introduced whenever the characteristics of the activity make this possible 
(World Bank, 2004). Although reviewing the vast literature dealing with the 
evaluation of privatization and with the impact of regulatory governance on 
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performance is beyond the scope of this paper44, some supporting evidence is 
available in the specific case of infrastructure. Andres et al. (2007) review the 
performance of 181 privatized firms in 3 sectors (telecommunications, electricity 
distribution, water and sewerage) across 15 Latin American countries. Controlling for 
existing pre-privatization and transition-period trends, they conclude that overall there 
are consistent improvements in operating performance and quality, reduction in the 
workforce, a tendency to price increases but with a lot of variability, and no 
significant impacts on output and coverage. When adding to their estimations 
contractual and regulatory characteristics, they conclude for example that regulatory 
autonomy and stability induce additional decrease in employment and output, while 
price cap regulation results in additional decreases in employment and labor 
productivity. Their main conclusion is clearly that regulation is a multi-dimensional 
issue, with complex effects on the array of outcomes they analyze. On the other hand, 
Guasch et al. (2007) show that price cap regulation also leads to numerous contract 
renegotiations. 
 
A number of caveats are in order here. First of all, even the most recent contributions 
provide only indirect links, through firm-level output, coverage and prices, to 
outcomes that matter to policy makers, such as aggregate output growth, welfare and 
poverty reduction.  Exercises such as the ones performed in 4 Latin American 
countries and summarized in McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) are still to be 
repeated on a larger scale. 
 
Moreover, while privatization is certainly a very exciting issue for researchers as well 
as a very controversial one in practice, the private sector still represents a rather small 
share of overall infrastructure spending and the current momentum indicates that it is 
not likely to grow substantially in the short term.  
 
IV. Directions for Future Research 
 
1. Main Challenges and Key Working Objectives 
Based on the papers and contributions reviewed above, this section summarizes the 
main challenges to be addressed by each strand of literature, as well as a number of 
“key working objectives” that could constitute reasonable short to medium term 
research objectives in each area. The next section looks at related data development 
issues. Finally, Table 5 in the conclusion summarizes the main recommendations. 
 
1.a.  Macroeconomic Literature 
 
As discussed in section 3.2 above, the main limitation is not a technical one but rather 
the fact that the interesting questions cannot be addressed with data at that level of 
aggregation, or to put it differently, that this line of research will not provide policy 
implications able to guide detailed investment decisions on the field. The situation is 
                                                 
44 See the review in Martimort and Straub (2006). 
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somewhat similar to that of the literature on institutional quality and development: 
Pande and Udry (2005) conclude that this literature has provided reasonably strong 
certainties on the fact that good institutions are a necessary condition for economic 
development to take place, but that it is time to move to a finer, microeconomic 
approach to specific institutions in order to derive meaningful policy implications. In 
that sense, Jorgenson’s statement (“The intrusion of macroeconomists armed with 
conventional econometric techniques into the infrastructure debate has been 
counterproductive”) could probably be adapted to: “The intrusion of macroeconomists 
armed with conventional econometric techniques into the infrastructure debate has 
yielded some useful insights (as well as a lot of confusion), but sticking to this 
approach much longer would be counterproductive”. 
 
So, what can macro-data still do for us?  
• They are useful to provide a general picture of the level of infrastructure 
development across countries (see introduction), but as I argue below, the 
aggregation of microeconomic survey data is the more promising avenue to 
develop such data.  
• They should give up the central role that they have had in the last twenty years 
in the empirical literature on the effect of infrastructure on development.  
• One area, however, in which they may prove useful, is the study of how 
institutional, regulatory and political economy characteristics of countries or 
regions affect the amount and quality of infrastructure services provided at the 
sector level. This implies strengthening the systematic collection of data on 
these aspects, such as is currently the case for telecommunications in the ICT 
“At a Glance” table in the Development Data Platform, or the recent logistic 
data (World Bank, 2007).  
• It would also benefit from a major theoretical modeling effort of the channels 
involved. 
 
Key Working Objectives 
 
• Step up current efforts to analyze the link between infrastructure sectors’ 
organization (including, among others, degree of competition, ownership, 
etc.), regulatory governance and sector’s performance (See Andres, Guasch 
and Lopez Azumendi, 2007, for an example of this approach with Latin 
American data). The objective should be to end up having a systematic picture 
of the results with broad international coverage, allowing for lessons to be 
drawn at the sector level, discriminating by initial level of development and 
other relevant country level characteristics (political system, inequality, etc.), 
as envisioned for example in Vagliasindi (2007).  
• Some of the key aspects to be analyzed include optimal organization, 
regulatory institutions, the sequencing of policy measures, the impact of 
measures geared towards the development of capacity to coordinate 
infrastructure development, etc. 
• More generally, when it comes to political and institutional aspects, an effort 
should be made to disentangle formal laws and regulations from the quality of 
their implementation, their enforcement, etc. 
• The empirical objective described above should be guided by an important 
modeling effort of the different channels involved. Key areas here include the 
impact of fiscal constraints on public investment (Servén, 2007), the link of 
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these constraints with optimal infrastructure investment needs at different 
stages of development (Fay and Yepes, 2003), the interplay between country 
and sector governance and different aspects of infrastructure development 
(level of investment, incentives to invest in maintenance vs. new investments, 
efficiency of different configurations, etc.). Conclusions should take into 
account the characteristics of the different sectors / countries under 
consideration. 
• These aspects involve crucial and complex interactions on which theoretical 
insights are missing, such as the link between financial constraints (of 
government and operators) and involvement of external financing agents 
(either private or multilateral) and how the multiprincipal nature of this 
situation affects the level and performance of investments.   
 
1.b.  Microeconometric Literature 
 
These contributions have in general yielded more robust insights into the human 
development effects of infrastructure, in particular because they allow for a better 
understanding of the interactions between service availability and other aspects such 
as financial development (Binswanger et al., 1993), level of education of household 
members (Thomas and Strauss, 1992), etc. This is particularly useful because 
infrastructure policies are not implemented in a vacuum and policy makers need to 
understand how they interact with other policies that affect different groups of the 
population. Moreover, household access data to services such as water, sanitation, 
electricity and telecommunications can be aggregated at the village / district /state 
level and used in large scale policy evaluations (more on this below when discussing 
sector level data recommendations). 
 
There are of course drawbacks to the microeconomic approach. First, 
microeconometric contributions are by nature focused on specific cases and contexts, 
so they may not always provide lessons that can be generalized. Second, as already 
mentioned, they have difficulties in capturing entrepreneurial activities that are not 
owned at the household level. 
 
The answer to this last point seems to be the development of large scale firm surveys 
such as the investment climate assessments (ICAs). Unfortunately, the “infrastructure 
content” of ICA surveys has been reduced over time. For example, Lee, Anas and Oh 
(1996) where able to assess infrastructure constraint for several sectors and had access 
to data on the cost of substitute capital investments by firms that have disappeared 
from more recent waves of these surveys. Moreover, apart from specific issues in the 
design of ICA surveys, their use to address infrastructure issues runs into a specific 
difficulty discussed at the end of the previous section, namely the fact that they are ill-
equipped to address endogenous technological choices by entrepreneurs. 
 
It seems reasonable that micro-data should become the main focus of data 
development efforts. 
• Household surveys should systematically incorporate module on 
infrastructure, designed in such a way to enable upwards aggregation with 
sufficient coverage of large geographic areas. 
• This would enable the collection of data on two additional aspects: the quality 
and the cost of services. 
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• Firm surveys such as ICAs should be designed with the specific objective in 
mind to address endogenous placement and (especially) endogenous 
technology choices.  
 
Key Working Objectives 
• Build on Briceño-Garmendia and Klytchnikova (2006) to define gaps and 
adjustment to be made to current household survey data collection. Define 
strategy implementable at the World Bank / multilateral donors’ level to 
generate such data, taking into account institutional / political constraints 
related to the ownership of such surveys. This should give special care to 
reach a complete coverage of infrastructure sub-sectors, for which linkages are 
often not well understood (e.g. rail, ports, airports, etc.). 
• Retake and evaluate existing ICA work and define gaps and adjustment to be 
made to current data collection to make infrastructure (one of) the prime 
objective of such surveys.  
• One crucial objective to be kept in mind when designing surveys should be to 
address correctly issues of innovations and productivity changes induced by 
infrastructure investment (e.g. new information technologies), that is the 
endogenous technological choice issue. 
• The sectoral coverage should also be as inclusive as possible. For example, 
transport should not include only roads but also ports, airports, railways; 
telecommunications should encompass different modes such as fixed and 
mobile telephony, internet access, etc. 
• Once this is done, generate pictures of interactions between infrastructure 
sectors and development outcomes (from macro to micro) on the basis of 
household/firm survey data. 
 
1.c.  Economic Geography 
 
Ideally, suitable empirical tests of new economic geography models will rely on 
household and firm-level data, together with spatially disaggregated infrastructure 
indicators. In a sense, these models represent an opportunity to apply micro-
econometric techniques on a large enough scale to generate interesting policy 
conclusions. 
 
A number of key issues remain to be addressed: 
• Can we enrich these models to include a better, more realistic representation 
of (all) infrastructure sectors, without making them intractable?  
• Technically, what is the best way to test these models? How do we go about 
addressing threshold effects in a dynamic context? How do we deal with 
multiple equilibria? There clearly needs to be more work on these issues. 
• Panel data are an absolute requirement to test models, which by nature imply 
dynamic changes in the distribution of economic activity as infrastructure 
investment occurs. 
 
Key Working Objectives 
 
• Sustain a large theoretical effort to develop new economic geography models 
that include more explicitly the different infrastructure sectors. This implies 
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• Build on the outcomes of actions outlined above (microeconomic data) to 
develop suitable panel data to test these models. 
• Develop suitable econometric techniques to address the challenges raised by 
new economic geography models. 
2. Data Development 
Transport 
Country-level roads length statistics need to be disaggregated at the regional / state 
level, and should also distinguish between different types of road. An example of the 
standard road statistics data that should be aimed can be found in Fan and Chan-Kang 
(2005) for China. They provide length of roads for 6 different classes, from 
expressways to substandard types, with more than 20 years coverage and 
disaggregated numbers at the regional level. Similarly disaggregated figures for 
alternative transport modes (railways, airports, ports, etc.) may complete the picture. 
Simultaneously, household / firm survey data should be generated on access to service 
(roads, railroads, etc.), assessment of cost / quality, and ownership of different types 
of vehicles. 
 
Energy 
Electricity is mostly proxied for by country-level electricity generation capacity. 
However, this is often a rather bad proxy to the availability and quality of electric 
services (see examples in Straub, 2007). Instead, we should aim at connection data at 
the household level and then aggregate these to get average connections rates at the 
village and district level. Similar data should be aimed at for gas connections. 
Additionally, both household and firm surveys infrastructure modules should include 
questions aimed at capturing: 
• The quality of services (number of outages, appliances or machines failures). 
• The cost of services (share of household budgets and of firms’ total costs). 
• The institutional nature of service providers and regulatory arrangements. 
• When applicable, investments in alternative supply mechanisms (generators, 
pumps) and their costs. 
 
Telecommunications 
Connection data on use and ownership of fixed telephone lines / mobile telephone 
lines / internet connections, should be collected at the household /firm level and then 
aggregated to get average connections rates at the village and district level. Distance 
to the closest available service point should be considered when no service is 
available in rural communities. As in the case of energy, additional information on the 
nature of the services (public phones, shared private phones, etc.), their quality, their 
cost and their institutional nature should complete the picture. 
 
Water and Sanitation 
Water and sewerage connection data should be collected at the household / firm level 
and then aggregated to get average connections rates at the village and district level. 
Distance to the closest available service point should be considered when no service is 
available in rural communities. Standard information on the nature of the services, 
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their quality, their cost and their institutional nature should complete the picture. This 
last aspect is especially relevant for water, which is often provided by local operators 
and regulated at the local rather than the national level. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The review of the infrastructure and development literature performed in this paper 
sustains a number of conclusions in terms of potential research areas and associated 
data development need, which can be organized in three related parts, relating to 
macroeconomic, microeconomic and economic geography aspects. In terms of data 
development, the main effort should be concentrated in the microeconomic part of the 
picture, through a strategy to gather data from both household and firm-level (ICAs) 
survey on aspects including access, quality and costs of services. Indicators, 
aggregated at different levels, could then be used both in macro-level and economic 
geography types of estimations. 
 
At the macro-level, the relevant challenges imply to move away from a long string of 
contributions that have tried to estimate the link between output or growth and 
aggregate indicators of infrastructure (public capital or physical indicators) and rather 
concentrate on how aspects linked to the political, institutional and regulatory 
environment have affected the delivery and efficiency of services in the different 
sectors. This also implies continuing with ongoing efforts to develop large databases 
on these features of the environment, and stepping up theoretical effort to understand 
the underlying mechanisms at work. 
 
The economic geography approach appears very promising, but infrastructure related 
work, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, is still in its infancy. 
Significant efforts are necessary to develop the relevant theories, include additional 
aspects of infrastructure beyond transportation, and develop suitable empirical 
strategies to test the models. The main related recommendations are summarized in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5: Summary of Recommendations 
 Key working objectives Data 
   
Macroeconomic 
aspects 
Theory: 
- Optimal infrastructure investment needs and 
fiscal constraints. 
- Interplay between country and sector 
governance and different aspects of 
infrastructure development. 
- The link between financial constraints (of 
government and operators) and involvement 
of external financing agents and how the 
multiprincipal nature of this situation affects 
the level and performance of investments.   
Empirical: 
- Step up current efforts to analyze the 
empirical link between infrastructure sectors’ 
organization (degree of competition, 
ownership, etc.), regulatory governance, the 
sequencing of policy measures, the impact of 
measures geared towards the development of 
capacity to coordinate infrastructure 
development, etc., and sectors’ performance. 
- Strengthen the 
systematic collection 
of data on institutional, 
regulatory and political 
economy 
characteristics of 
sectors / regions / 
countries. 
- For infrastructure 
access / quality / cost 
data, use output from 
microeconomic data 
gathering effort. 
Microeconomic 
aspects 
Empirical: 
- Define gaps and adjustment to be made to 
current household survey data collection and 
strategy implementable at the WB level to 
generate such data, taking into account 
institutional / political constraints related to 
the ownership of such surveys. 
- Retake and evaluate existing ICA work and 
define gaps and adjustment to be made to 
current data collection to make infrastructure 
(one of) the prime objective of such surveys.  
- Address endogenous technological choice 
issue in the context of firm-level data. 
 
- Generate data on 
access, quality and 
costs in the four main 
sectors, to feed in both 
macroeconomic and 
economic geography 
research. 
Economic 
Geography 
Theory: 
- Develop new economic geography models 
that include more explicitly the different 
infrastructure sectors.  
- Address shortcomings to the current 
modeling of transportation. 
- Include other aspects, such as 
telecommunications, electricity and water, in 
the theoretical framework.   
Empirical: 
- Develop suitable econometric techniques and 
panel data to test these models. 
- Use output from 
microeconomic data 
gathering effort, to 
develop adequate GTC 
measures for 
developing countries, 
as well as indicators 
for other dimensions of 
infrastructure. 
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